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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 On appeal, the State has conceded that “recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions 
holding that implied consent may be revoked renders the implied consent exception 
inapplicable under the facts of this case.”  Accordingly, that issue is not addressed any 
further.  However, the instant Reply Brief in necessary to address the State’s exigent 
circumstances analysis and its argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the 
district court’s order denying Ms. Franklin’s motion to suppress may be affirmed on an 
alternative ground, not previously addressed by any party, much less the district court.  
For the reasons articulated herein and in Ms. Franklin’s Appellant’s Brief, the district 
court erred by denying Ms. Franklin’s motion to suppress the results of the warrantless 
blood draw. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Franklin’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
 2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Franklin’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Franklin’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. The District Court’s Pertinent Factual Findings Were Clearly Erroneous And Not 
Supported By Evidence Offered By The State 
 
In its briefing, the State challenges Ms. Franklin’s argument that the district court 
made a clearly erroneous factual finding in determining Deputy Tatalian did not request 
the blood draw until around midnight.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.6-8.)  Specifically, the 
State challenges Ms. Franklin’s reliance on Deputy Tatalian’s adoption of 11:17 p.m. as 
the time he contacted Boise County to seek a phlebotomist as “mystifying”  because the 
referenced dispatch records were not offered into evidence during the suppression 
hearing.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.7.)  In presenting its argument, the State’s recitation of 
the underlying record is not entirely forthcoming with this Court.  The State fails to 
acknowledge that, in its objection to Ms. Franklin’s motion to suppress, the prosecutor 
argued that “Deputy Tatilian notified dispatch that he needed a phlebotomist to go to St. 
Alphonsus Hospital for a blood draw at 11:17 p.m.”  (R., p.63.)  Then, at the 
suppression hearing, the following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and his 
witness, Deputy Tatilian: 
Prosecutor: At some point did you, by way of radio, contact your dispatch 
in Boise County to seek a phlebotomist and officer to 
accomplish a blood draw? 
 
Tatilian: I did. 
 
Prosecutor: Do you recall what time that was? 
 
Tatilian: I don’t recall a specific time off the top of my head, no. 
 
Prosecutor: If the dispatch log indicates 11:17, would that be accurate? 
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Tatilian: It would be within[] a minute or two of me calling, yes. 
 
(12/26/13 Tr., p.14, L.22 – p.15, L.7.) 
 On appeal, the State characterizes Officer Tatilian’s testimony as, just that the 
dispatch log would be accurate within two minutes of him calling, and seems to 
conclude that the prosecutor’s reference to the time reflected on the log of 11:17 at the 
time of the call as superfluous.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.7, fn 1.)  In addressing this issue, 
the State omits from its briefing the fact that, in the district court, the prosecutor had 
taken the position the call occurred at 11:17 p.m. and it was the prosecutor that was 
asking Officer Tatilian to adopt the time of the requested blood draw being 11:17 p.m.  It 
is clear that Officer Tatilian’s response to the prosecutor’s question was an adoption of 
time of the call being 11:17.  The specific question from the prosecutor was:  “If the 
dispatch log indicates 11:17, would that be accurate?”  (12/26/13 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-5.)  
Officer Tatilian’s answer was: “It would be within[] a minute or two of me calling, yes.”  
(12/26/13 Tr., p.15, Ls.6-7.)  Officer Tatilian is clearly answering the question asked by 
the prosecutor: “It would be [accurate,] within[] a minute or two of me calling, yes.”  
(12/26/13 Tr., p.15, Ls.6-7 (alteration in brackets).)  To the extent there was any 
confusion that Officer Tatilian was adopting the time referenced by the prosecutor, it is 
removed when the officer concludes his answer with an affirmative, “yes.”   (12/26/13 
Tr., p.15, Ls.6-7 (alteration in brackets).)  Accordingly, Officer Tatilian was unequivocally 
adopting 11:17 p.m. as the time he called to request a phlebotomist and the State’s 
attempts to distance itself from the prosecutor’s position below should be disregarded.   
 Even if there was competent evidence to conclude that Officer Tatilian did not, 
and could not have sought to obtain a warrant until approximately midnight, the forty 
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minutes from the time the officer completed his investigation and the blood draw 
ultimately occurred was ample time to seek and obtain a valid telephonic warrant.1  As 
Justice Roberts wrote in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, judges in 
Utah have been known to issue warrants in as little as five minutes while in one county 
in Kansas, warrants are processed in less than fifteen minutes.  Missouri v. McNeely, 
133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013) (J. Roberts concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Here, the 
State did not offer any testimony as to how long it would taken to obtain a telephonic 
warrant, and as such, failed to meet its burden to establish a valid exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.  However, even if the State had 
met its burden, forty minutes is more than sufficient time for Deputy Tatilian to seek and 
obtain a telephonic warrant. 
 
B. The State Waived Its Allegation That The Search In This Case Was Not Action 
Taken By A Government Agent By Not Raising That Issue In The District Court 
 
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues, “Franklin failed to prove that a search 
protected by the Fourth Amendment occurred when a nurse already drawing blood for 
medical purposes merely filled additional sample tubes for law enforcement use.”  
(Respondent’s Brief, pp.4, 10-11.)  At no point in its brief does the State acknowledge 
that this issue or theory was not presented to the district court and never ruled on by the 
district court.  The State’s brief does not indicate that it is raising this new theory for the
                                            
1 Upon reviewing the district court’s memorandum order denying Ms. Franklin’s motion 
to suppress, undersigned counsel acknowledges that the district court did not find it 
would take two to three hours to obtain a warrant and hereby withdraws that portion of 
the Appellant’s Brief to the extent it argues that finding was clearly erroneous.   
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first time on appeal, nor does it admit to this Court that the prosecutor below effectively 
conceded this issue when he agreed with the district court that the burden had shifted to 
the State to show a valid exception to the warrant requirement.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.6, L.22 
– p.7, L.2.)  Finally, in arguing that the search was not conducted by a government 
agent for the first time on appeal, the State fails to disclose controlling legal authority 
directly adverse to its position.  See Obenchain v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 
57 (2006) (“Appellate court review ‘is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments 
that were presented . . . below.’  Consequently, appellate courts will not consider new 
arguments raised for the first time on appeal.”); see also State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 
509, 515 n.4 (2010) (recognizing generally that the Respondent cannot raise good faith 
exception the first time on appeal); State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 567 & n.5 (2007) 
(holding that the Respondent cannot invoke the catchall hearsay exception for the first 
time on appeal); and State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364 (2015) (recognizing appellant 
cannot raise an issue not before the trial court for the first time on appeal). 
Thus, the State is foreclosed from arguing a new theory for the first time on 
appeal and this Court should refuse to consider the State’s argument on appeal that the 
search was not conducted by an agent of the State of Idaho. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Ms. Franklin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order 
denying her motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 11th day of May, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
      Chief, Appellate Unit 
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